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South Korea’s National Identity Sensitivity: 
Evolution, Manifestations, Prospects
by Gilbert Rozman
National identity in South Korea is steeped in historical regret laced with 
wishful pursuit of idealistic absolution. Intemperate bouts of seeking im-
mediate satisfaction draw support from the right or the left, leaders above 
or the public below. This is a situation in clear contrast to the postwar 
pattern in Japan of a persistent buildup by forces of the far right to shift 
the national identity equilibrium, and in China of two sustained drumbeats 
orchestrated by the left from the top down. In those two states the objec-
tive has been to restore a full measure of pride after a historical interlude 
regarded as abnormal by political elites. In contrast, South Koreans seek 
to discover a suitable source of pride in a history that provides few heroes 
amid continuing confusion over what might be considered normal. Three 
lengthy experiences of kowtowing sadae,* the two shocks of decapitation 
by the Japanese and dismemberment at the hands of the Soviet Union and 
the United States, and repeated frustrations of overreaching and being taught 
the lessons of helplessness remain ﬁ xated in the national mentality. Pride 
in an exceptional record of postwar achievement is clouded by a dearth of 
self-conﬁ dence under the weight of such nationalistic emotions.
Over just 10 years observers have repeatedly been drawn to bursts of ex-
pression of national identity in South Korea. In 1997–98 the response to the 
Asian ﬁ nancial crisis puzzled many: a combination of resentment against 
the International Monetary Fund, sacriﬁ ce for the nation, and reafﬁ rmed 
globalization. This was followed in 2000 when the inter-Korean summit 
stimulated a mix of new national pride, unexpected adulation of Kim Jong-il, 
and reconsideration of the importance of the United States with the poten-
tial to unleash long-suppressed resentment. In 2002, cohosting the World 
Cup brought nationalist intensity to a high pitch: the Red Devils’ collective 
boosterism swept the nation along with pride in the soccer team’s perfor-
mance. By year end another target had emerged for nationalist emotions: 
anti-Americanism took center stage,1 impacting the presidential election 
while accelerating a shift in political inﬂ uence across generations. During 
the summer of 2004 passions turned to the Koguryo issue, seen as China’s 
usurpation of Korea’s history.2 By the spring of 2005, as in 2001, the vil-
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lain was Japan, rekindling long-felt antagonism in a more comprehensive 
manner: casting doubt on the normalization of relations, challenging its 
international aspirations, and ﬁ xating on its territorial and military ambi-
tions as latent threats.3 In 2007 it appeared that these bouts of nationalism 
had passed in sobering reﬂ ection on the stormy tenure of Roh Moo-hyun 
and unusual consensus behind the businesslike presidential candidacy of 
Lee Myung-bak.4 Yet, in the spring of 2008 an outcry against Lee’s deci-
sion, useful to ratiﬁ cation of the bilateral free trade agreement, to resume 
U.S. beef imports demonstrated that even an obscure spark could reignite 
the nation’s emotions. They had barely settled when other perceived shocks 
raised anxiety levels again and again. Instead of abating in 2008 under a 
president reluctant to stir up emotions, national identity themes are again 
in the forefront.
In 2008 the spotlight kept falling on the impact of national identity in South 
Korea. After the December 2007 election of staunch conservative Lee to 
replace unpopular Roh, a fervent progressive, Koreans awaited a far-reaching 
shift in domestic and foreign policy. Yet, in a deeply divided country one 
could not anticipate a smooth transition. In these circumstances, one symbol 
of national identity after another emerged as a bone of contention: depen-
dency on the United States arose in relation to the decision to resume beef 
imports despite health fears; historical memories associated with Japan 
reappeared in response to its new guidelines for Dokdo/Takeshima cover-
age in school textbooks; sinocentrism ﬁ gured into disputes over China’s 
Olympic torch relay through Seoul and the booing of South Korean teams 
at the Olympics; following the shooting death of a South Korean tourist at 
the Mt. Kumgang resort, tensions grew over the North’s refusal to investi-
gate as the North proceeded to sever most ties with the South and reverse 
a decade of steps toward reuniﬁ cation; the world ﬁ nancial crisis beginning 
in fall 2008 reopened decade-old fears of vulnerability to globalization; and 
on October 30 an order was issued to the anger of progressives to delete or 
revise high school textbook passages seen by conservatives as undermining 
the legitimacy of the government. At stake was not only the outcome of a 
polarized political battle but also the reconstruction of a national identity 
that had never found broad consensus and lately appears increasingly in 
dispute.
Observers have been slow to awaken to the problematic nature of South 
Korean national identity. After all, there has long been awareness of the 
homogeneous nature of the population, its staunch nationalism on occasions 
such as the 1988 Seoul Olympics and 2002 World Cup, shared conﬁ dence in 
the country’s “economic miracle,” and joint antipathy to Japan’s revisionist 
history. Before the 1990s few doubted the prevalence of anticommunism; 
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pride in premodern symbols such as King Seejong, the originator of the 
hangul script; determination to preserve an insular society; and gratitude to 
the United States as deﬁ ning elements of a South Korean overall identity. 
Even as the democratic movement put progressives in ever-more-prominent 
roles, this was typically seen as part of a political struggle rather than of a 
more fundamental clash over national identity. Yet, as divisions have in-
tensiﬁ ed over history, society, and foreign policy, it has become clear that 
Koreans remain deeply split over matters central to a basic understanding 
of what their nation represents and what implications should ﬂ ow from that 
at home and abroad.5
The past two decades have exacerbated the divisions over national identity, 
but a changing regional and global environment in 2009 may offer some 
promise. A dual crisis in the world economy and in North-South relations 
may lead to reconnecting with Cold War challenges and recognizing more 
continuity in national identity. For this to happen, however, reasoning about 
national interests must overcome oversensitivity about identity at the same 
time as leadership forges a new synthesis with appeal across the spectrum. 
A solution cannot be found by pretending that national identity does not 
matter; a solution must rest on some kind of compromise highlighting ele-
ments of identity that serve urgent goals.
Evolution of Korean National Identity
The ideological paralysis over history bedevils efforts to bring clarity to 
national identity. Marxist-derived analysis similar to the historiography 
that prevailed in Japan or even China in the 1950s never lost its hold in 
progressive circles. The result is excessive negativity about the country’s 
past, marked by a distorting focus on “revolutionaries” as heroic ﬁ ghters 
against an oppressive environment. Those with three-dependency thinking 
(ﬁ xated on successive subservience to China, Japan, and the United States) 
are blinded to the positive forces in national history, as if there is room only 
for narratives about how Korean history was derailed. Sandwiched between 
China with its precocious premodern past and record of regional centrality 
and Japan with its late premodern dynamism and modern rise to regional 
ascendency, Korea pales in comparisons that fail to appreciate its own rela-
tive strengths on an international comparative scale and its lack of reasons 
for guilt in external relations. This is especially true in the postwar period, 
about which there should be ample reason for pride as well as identiﬁ cation 
with the United States as the global leader whose inclusive values opened 
an opportunity for South Korea’s economic miracle and democratization. 
Through revised comparative analysis, Koreans could take pride in how their 
country has repeatedly seized opportunities in conﬁ ning circumstances.
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Conservatives also have eschewed forthright comparisons in order to put 
positive spin on a history that they too ﬁ nd problematic. This includes 
mythologizing about the reputed founder, Tangun, of the Korean nation 
and exaggerating the distinctive character of its past without due acknowl-
edgment of some of its shortcomings and incorporating forthrightly their 
own repudiation of much of history. Their anachronistic desire to cling to 
patriarchal values and Confucianism in the face of the customary pres-
sures from modernization for more equality reﬂ ect defensiveness owing 
to their own dearth of conﬁ dence in integration with the outside, including 
acceptance of universal values. In Korean textbooks, media coverage of 
events, and government dealings with foreign states, excessive nationalism 
shadows the balanced narrative expected of a mature democracy. There is 
also a lack of independent sources of legitimacy—for elites of old, for the 
civil service, for liberal values, for trust in democratic institutions and the 
rule of law.6 Given unequivocal successes in borrowing, catching up, and 
contributing to the global order, Koreans can take due pride in their nation’s 
achievements without having to gloss over its shortcomings and becoming 
mired in incessant ﬁ ghting of domestic ideological wars.
Chinese Confucianism became the core of the traditional Korean worldview 
with many positive consequences for state building, family cohesion and 
mobility, and interest in learning.7 The fact that Confucianism was imported 
and also left a negative legacy that still requires some de-Confucianization 
should not detract from recognition of it as an inseparable part of history 
with lasting impact on national identity.8 Its stress on ritualism has parallels 
to constitutionalism in setting the standard for judging political leadership, 
even if applying that standard became mired in factionalism.9 Japanese 
modernization aided and inspired Korea’s transformation as it prepared 
the way for Korea’s so-called economic miracle. Humiliating memories 
and justiﬁ able frustration with Japan’s self-serving view of its role on the 
peninsula should not interfere with a balanced evaluation that recognizes 
the lingering effect of colonial rule on Korea’s development and identity.10
Above all, U.S. protection of the South, assistance in development, and in-
spiration for democratic change deserve recognition as part of rightful pride 
in the postwar era, which provides a shared success story despite images 
of “dictatorial developmentalism” or “democracy in the grip of unceasing 
demonstrations.”11 Through an objective comparative perspective on the 
three stages of evolution to the end of the Cold War, Koreans could show 
pride in the state’s extraordinary achievement without whitewashing stains 
in historical memory.
South Korea spent the entire twentieth century frustrated by its repeated 
inability to exercise sovereignty in the manner of other states. Nationalism 
emerged belatedly in the frustrating circumstances of Japanese colonization 
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and then cultural genocide.12 It was rekindled by military dictators intent on 
channeling it into support for authoritarian rule, but it broke free in the 1980s 
in the midst of further frustration over delayed and then only incomplete 
democracy. At critical moments in the 1990s the amount of democracy was 
eclipsed in people’s minds by the issue of the amount of sovereignty. The 
result was little common ground for syncretism owing to a record of iden-
tity obliteration: Japanese hostility to the Chinese-centered Choson order; 
postwar Korean repudiation of the colonial order; democratized Koreans’ 
criticism of the dictatorial era; and, in post–Cold War years, conservatives 
and progressives taking turns at repudiating each other’s rule. Such narrow 
negativity leaves little basis for developing a broad notion of national identity 
that could emerge, in stages, from Korea’s past. Discontinuous history with 
virtually no positive models is a recipe for confusion, apparently leading 
some to grasp for utopian solutions.
A combination of four developments tested South Korean national identity 
anew. First, democratization in 1987 followed by national embrace of the 
Olympics of 1988 put the public in the forefront, and in the course of recur-
rent demonstrations and newfound civic organizations top-down manage-
ment of nationalism no longer was possible. Second, the end of the Cold War 
in 1989 leading to normalization with Moscow and then Beijing as well as 
the isolation and greater sense of urgency in Pyongyang altered the prism 
for viewing the diplomatic and strategic environment critical to national 
identity. Third, a new view of the United States was gradually forming in 
the 1990s, driven by its unilateralism in the ﬁ rst nuclear crisis with North 
Korea and the Asian ﬁ nancial crisis, highlighting the South’s lack of control 
over its own destiny. Finally, the impoverishment of the North as seen in its 
famine and the prospect of direct dealings with it, punctuated by the summit 
of 15 June 2000, offered promise, albeit mixed with great uncertainty, for 
the South to play a very active role not only on peninsular matters but also 
in rallying the powers in the region to address its most signiﬁ cant strategic 
challenge. After long periods of suppressed debates about national identity, 
these developments brought an outpouring of views, especially stimulating 
progressive voices to challenge earlier thinking.
Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun sought to transform Korean national iden-
tity. The Sunshine Policy was presented as consistent with alliance relations, 
international responsibilities, and improved ties to each of Seoul’s neighbors. 
Yet, its implementation revealed a deeper purpose with radical implica-
tions. Offering bribes to Pyongyang with the expectation that they would 
be forthcoming at each stage of improved relations even if reciprocity was 
meager while empowering nongovernmental organizations with an idealistic 
worldview meant a distorted kind of Koreanization. Pyongyang could set 
the terms of the relationship, as South Koreans in their 30s incubated in the 
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democratization movement of the 1980s challenged some deep assumptions 
of postwar national identity. The result was further confusion about national 
identity with no prospect of resolving mounting contradictions.
All over the world national identities have been in ﬂ ux since the abrupt 
changes from 1989 to 2001 in the global geopolitical and economic order 
but also in response to new ﬂ ux in 2008–09. In the case of South Korea, 
we can identify many forces that accelerated change in identity more than 
elsewhere in the ﬁ rst transition and with potential to exert a strong inﬂ u-
ence in the second one. For those who argue that the greater the structural 
discontinuity, the more the ﬂ ux in identity, the South stands as a candidate 
for a tectonic shift. It was at the front line of the Cold War that has ended, 
dramatically changing its diplomatic partners. Its economic system was 
abruptly transformed from a model of unparalleled success to a kind of 
albatross to be removed. Long-frozen prospects for reuniﬁ cation with 
the North reappeared suddenly on the political agenda. Finally, a nation 
accustomed to high levels of economic and cultural autarchy, protected 
by numerous barriers, precipitously faced a massive infusion of global 
and regional inﬂ uences. Given such radical disruptions, we should not be 
surprised that South Korea is a world leader in speed of change in national 
identity and confusion over it.
Yet, amid much uncertainty, some realities do not seem to have changed 
much at all. As an ally of the United States and a democracy, the South 
could not shake the view that China and Russia retain an alien quality. In 
1999–2007 the economy gained a reprieve, but again beginning in 2008 
economic crisis put its prospects in doubt. Above all, North Korea repeat-
edly challenged the South’s assumptions and in 2008–09 carried this to an 
extreme. Remnants of the old identity are resurfacing, even as progressives 
struggle to sustain their worldview. Rapid transformation in national identity 
also may occur in this second period of transition. This offers an opportunity 
as well as poses a danger of paralysis in trying times.
Manifestations of National Identity
Confusion over national identity allows political leaders to arouse emo-
tions while reducing the possibility of centrist thinking gaining ground 
at the expense of ideological extremes. It leaves in doubt how consensus 
can be reached over policies aimed at forging a more just society. In these 
circumstances, foreign policy cannot easily be pursued on an even course. 
The result also is that history becomes a contested battleﬁ eld rather than 
a source of shared inspiration. Given the depth of contestation over South 
Korean national identity (including confusion over the place of North Ko-
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rea), initiatives by one president or another or by a U.S. president arouse 
suspicion with little chance of building cohesion.
The upsurge in national identity consciousness gave national leaders new 
reason to play on public emotions in order to raise their popularity or realize 
their agenda. From Roh Tae-woo to Roh Moo-hyun, manipulation of public 
opinion intensiﬁ ed. Roh Tae-woo was most cautious. His nordpolitik toward 
Russia and China as the Cold War was ending removed anticommunism as a 
rallying cry. While Japan remained an easy target, such as when Kanemaru 
Shin went to Pyongyang bypassing Seoul in search of a breakthrough, it 
was not singled out. Also, in the midst of U.S. pressure to open the South’s 
protected economy and with memories of Olympic resentment toward U.S. 
athletes, Roh Tae-woo hesitated to cater to the emboldened progressives. 
This was also the inclination of Kim Young-sam, but he proved to be more 
mercurial toward Japan, North Korea, and even the United States. Inconsis-
tencies toward Japan especially marked this period as Kim Young-sam took 
populist measures, as in 1995 when the architectural symbol of colonial rule 
was razed. Kim Dae-jung adopted a different approach to arousing national 
identity. While agreeing with Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo to put the his-
tory issue aside and to undertake a mutual cultural opening and reassuring 
President Bill Clinton of his embrace of globalization after the ﬁ nancial 
crisis, Kim concentrated on the Sunshine Policy, thus transforming the im-
age of North Korea into one of a partner able to embrace reuniﬁ cation even 
when its domestic policies, development of weapons of mass destruction, 
and belligerent rhetoric cast doubt on this decision. Finally, Roh Moo-hyun 
activated national identity emotions repeatedly, catering to anti-Americanism 
beginning with his election campaign in 2002, shifting in 2005 to the most 
vitriolic anti-Japanese rhetoric in decades, and manipulating views on North 
Korea for domestic and international objectives with insufﬁ cient regard for 
national security.
Complicating the quest for a balanced approach are contested, mislead-
ing images of the identities and foreign policy explanations of three states 
central to South Korean thinking about their own national identity: North 
Korea, Japan, and the United States. A candid assessment of North Korea as 
a totalitarian regime destructive of the national heritage can best underscore 
a sound understanding of the South’s identity. This does not mean revival of 
the crude anticommunism steeped in demands for censorship or warnings 
of subversion of past years, nor is it incompatible with measured engage-
ment of the North as a path to regional stability and possible reform there. 
Instead, it could bring a sober awakening conducive to bridging the ideologi-
cal divide after the heady optimism in progressive circles in 1998–2007.13
The goal of such engagement is less reuniﬁ cation in the foreseeable future 
than adjustment in national identity. The six-party talks opened the door to 
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measured engagement, but Roh Moo-hyun sought ways to refocus on inter-
Korean relations, culminating in the October 2007 Pyongyang summit that 
delinked large-scale economic projects from the denuclearization process 
and pointed to “three- or four-party talks” on establishing a peace regime. 
To the extent that progressives could create a sense of optimism about such 
projects and the path forward with the North, they could undercut, ﬁ rst, the 
anticommunist legacy of postwar identity and, second, the justiﬁ cations for 
deference to the United States. In this way, the theme of Korean nationalism 
could be released from tight restraints. This approach only widened the gulf 
inside South Korea.
Mischaracterization of Japan also mars thinking about national identity. Not 
enough credit is given to its postwar transformation or its role as the demili-
tarized engine of the entire region’s rise. Recognition of reality in Japan does 
not require relaxation of criticisms of revisionist tendencies, but it would 
serve Korea’s own search for identity as well as mutual trust in bilateral 
relations.14 South Koreans are particularly prone to status disappointments 
even when the events in question appear to others to be inconsequential. 
Japan’s quest to become a permanent member of the United Nations Se-
curity Council in 2005 along with three other states posed the danger of 
a new dividing line between the world’s elite states—the permanent ﬁ ve 
transformed into the permanent nine—and those left behind, such as South 
Korea, which recently perceived itself as 10th–13th economically and in 
other respects as well. If much of the fault lies with Japanese leaders, the 
outcome remains a tinderbox for South Koreans who seek to put national 
interest above identity.
Finally, renewed consensus on behalf of U.S. liberal values and alliance sup-
port need not mean deepening of South Korean dependence on the United 
States or amnesia about U.S. missteps, often associated with failing to ad-
here to its liberal values.15 Made easier by the Obama administration’s less 
hypocritical espousal of values, a consensus on the U.S. role in Asia since 
1945 might be the single most important step in clarifying South Korean 
national identity as it concerns views about countries critical to national 
status and prospects. By taking discussions of human rights off the table in 
dealing with North Korea, Roh Moo-hyun left vague his nation’s commit-
ment to universal values. In contrast, Lee Myung-bak put them high on his 
agenda even as the North vehemently denounced him for interference in 
its domestic affairs. Because this was done after U.S. ofﬁ cials had dropped 
regime change from their agenda and stopped prioritizing human rights 
toward the North, this did not mean succumbing to the unilateralist early 
Bush interpretation of values. Yet, it afﬁ rmed South Korean globalization 
and the potential for liberal values to advance between the extremes of 
progressivism and conservatism.
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Seoul lacks signiﬁ cance in Washington to inﬂ uence policies toward the great 
powers. It also lacks credibility for letting national identity issues get in the 
way of realist calculations. Domestic politics appear too antagonistic for rea-
soned exchange. Reactions to Japan ﬂ y in the face of U.S. realist arguments. 
When U.S. ofﬁ cials have taken a broad regional or values perspective they 
have not found a receptive audience. In this context, problems in national 
identity contribute to overreach in international relations: turning the mission 
of strong state guidance of catch-up development into overbearing dictato-
rial intervention, distorting steps toward globalization by keeping a distance 
from the U.S.-dominated international community, rushing a perceived 
opportunity to engage North Korea into the incautious Sunshine Policy 
of secret payments bereft of reciprocity, and adjusting to a new balance of 
power in the region by claiming to be a balancer rather than ﬁ lling a more 
modest role of facilitator at moments when interests overlap. Indicative of 
these problems is a record of peripatetic responses to insensitive Japanese 
provocations. Also evident are bouts of unguarded romanticism or at least 
loss of caution toward China and Russia too.16 Without a shared national 
vision and a realistic timetable for reducing the country’s dependency, South 
Koreans have little prospect of gaining acceptance as a respected member 
and possible inspirational voice of an emerging East Asian community.
The struggle between contrasting worldviews came to a head at the end of 
2008. Lee Myung-bak issued a statement charging that the national iden-
tity had been under attack and that he was determined to crack down on 
intensifying ideological provocations by domestic left-leaning forces that 
further threaten it. As his spokesman Lee Dong-kwan explained, “President 
Lee is concerned that the constitutional values of the Republic of Korea 
are increasingly challenged by leftist forces seeking to promote anti-U.S., 
pro–North Korea and anti-market viewpoints across society.”17 At stake are 
efforts to rewrite textbooks, to change the bias of the national television 
stations, and to deﬁ ne the meaning of the Korean War, as Lee made plans 
to host a summit of all 21 nations involved. Yet, as a partisan leader, Lee’s 
credibility may not sufﬁ ce for uprooting progressive distortions.
Another sign of identity confusion is the increasing struggle between an 
assertive notion of cultural homogeneity and newfound confusion over the 
core of “Koreanness.” Diversiﬁ cation of experience—including immigra-
tion, emigration, intermarriage, internationalized life experiences, priority of 
English language learning—has muddied the once pure notion of a uniﬁ ed 
nation in ways that are more unsettling than where heterogeneity is more 
expected. Ethnicity has proven difﬁ cult to separate from national identity.18
Signs of unstable, unbalanced national identity appear in the contentious 
political arena, the sharp media divergence of views, the pronounced divide 
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in society, and recent inconsistent messages conveyed to foreign govern-
ments. Given the strong presidency, South Korea is not blocked from policy 
initiatives, but ideological paralysis makes vital clariﬁ cation of national 
identity inconceivable in the short run. Missing is a civil service that oper-
ates as the pillar of the state in a manner such that changes in administration 
do not shake the foundation of a consensus-driven society. In comparison 
with Japan or the United States, the bureaucracy in South Korea does not 
ﬁ ll this role. Crony appointments of successive presidents deny it this 
potential. Deﬁ ciencies in decentralization or division of power exacerbate 
the problem. Social cohesion is missing in a society where the state has an 
excessive impact and hierarchical control interferes with initiative at lower 
levels. Yet, society is experiencing great ﬂ ux, perhaps opening the door to 
leadership that would ﬁ nally reconstruct social cohesion and, with it, a more 
coherent national identity.
Prospects for National Identity
Whether exuberant claims by a president or candlelit vigils by young crowds, 
the messages from South Korea keep complicating foreign relations. Because 
the United States is still regional leader as well as an ally and is the only 
state capable of setting the agenda in Northeast Asia, it bears the burden of 
charting a foreign policy course that could serve to balance South Korean 
national identity concerning surrounding states. Unilateral moves such as 
in the early George W. Bush years do not sufﬁ ce. They reinforce a sense 
that the South is dependent and does not have any control over its own 
destiny. Weak policies that leave the impression of U.S. abandonment offer 
no reassurance either, as there is no reason to trust regional states to resolve 
any pressing problems. The shadow of North Korea darkens the region, 
and the credibility of U.S. leadership depends on a strategy to manage its 
threatening existence. To avoid exacerbating the divide between progressives 
and conservatives and to ease the way for the South to ﬁ nd a new identity 
equilibrium in dealing with states active in the region, U.S. leaders need to 
offer reassurance about the alliance, a carefully calibrated mix of carrots 
and sticks toward the North, and a regional agenda that holds out promises 
for stability and security as well for narrowing values differences.
With support from the United States, South Korea has a chance, brieﬂ y 
seized by Kim Dae-jung, to be a facilitator in forging a vision of regional-
ism on the foundation of universal values. As it simultaneously works to 
enhance the alliance triangle tied to the U.S.-Japanese dyad, the six-party 
framework’s peace regime group with the Sino-U.S. dyad in the forefront, 
as well as the denuclearization triangle with the U.S.–North Korea dyad, 
South Korea can broaden its understanding of national identity. Opposing 
North Korean belligerence through coordination centering ﬁ rst of all on the 
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United States is an essential starting point for a long-term strategy directed 
at regional cooperation and pride.
Fragmentation profoundly inﬂ uences South Korea. The conservative-
progressive divide has not subsided. Views of politics remain steeped in 
regional roots to the degree that voting strikingly reﬂ ects one’s geographical 
location. The upwardly mobile middle class enmeshed in well-established 
organizations stands in sharp contrast with the new idealist nongovernmental 
organizations and the militant labor movement. The failure of the state to 
stand above the fray as a respected pillar of social order lies at the heart of 
these divisions. Among conservatives and progressives there are further 
divides, causing instability in political parties and uncertainty about how to 
forge a shared vision. The dual crisis in 2009 of the world economy and North 
Korean belligerence could narrow these differences if U.S. leadership proves 
inspiring and South Korean leadership forges collective conﬁ dence.
Koreans often have blamed themselves as much as the United States for the 
failure to normalize identity. Similar to Japanese conservatives who were 
vigorously pressing for “normality” against the perceived opposition of the 
leftist media, teachers, political parties, and even “Asianist” bureaucrats, 
Korean progressives were leading the charge. They blamed the dictatorship 
and incomplete democratization as they waited for the opportunity for one 
of their own to become president, which ﬁ nally happened in 1998. Removed 
from power for a long time and ﬁ nally able to take over the powerful of-
ﬁ ce of president, they intensely sought to express their version of national 
identity. Yet, it was difﬁ cult to act because the president lacked legitimacy. 
Under Japanese rule and nearly four decades of assaults on democracy in the 
name of promoting it, South Koreans had become accustomed to doubting 
their leaders. Democratic elections did not change that. Widespread cor-
ruption and cronyism put the state in the hands of cliques not trusted for 
competence or fairness. This made the push for national identity less about 
reclaiming the honor of the state and rebuilding its authority than about 
creating a radically new state steeped in a pure identity unknown in the past. 
If Japanese revisionism had deep roots in realism, imagined or actual, South 
Korean progressivism was more utopian than realist. After all, dictators had 
abused the notion of realism in pursuit of a monopoly on power and their 
own twist on national identity; progressives continued to face conservative 
pressure in the name of realism as they impatiently tried to break free of its 
restraints. A new outlook on realism is necessary, steeped in crisis but also 
targeted at hard choices.
Koreans struggle with notions of national humiliation. The shame of an-
nexation by Japan was not erased, leading Park Chung-hee to trace it back 
millennia to failings in the nation’s traditional culture. The dilemma of a 
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divided nation, severed so completely that there was no way to know if one’s 
separated family members were alive or dead, showed no prospect of being 
resolved. Dependency on the United States was a troubling necessity, and 
economic reliance on Japan, with which diplomatic normalization had oc-
curred on embarrassingly expedient terms, could not be overcome. Divided at 
home and in a weak position in relations with the great powers, especially the 
United States, Koreans could ﬁ nd no way to gain satisfaction about Korean 
national identity. This persistent frustration led some groups to desperate 
choices inconsistent with the realities Koreans faced. A more serious set of 
realities in 2009 may at last dislodge these negative self-images.
Koreans share the desire for more autonomy in international relations, a 
higher status in relation to key countries, and uniﬁ cation of the peninsula. 
Yet conservatives are prone to put these in the context of preservation of 
the existing social order at home and coordination with a dependable ally 
as part of international society that can be trusted. In contrast, progressives 
impatiently set aside some restraints in search of a breakthrough process 
with the North with far-reaching identity consequences from the outset. Un-
like China or Japan, South Korea is not a great power and has no memory 
of challenging for regional hegemony. In all directions it sees states that 
at some point have denied its status aspirations. Recently, there has been a 
repeat of these frustrations: the United States in 2001–03 was blamed for 
stiﬂ ing Kim Dae-jung’s diplomatic endeavors; Japan is accused repeatedly—
because of its textbook revisions and territorial claims—of insulting Korean 
sentiments; and China with its historical assertions about the Koguryo state 
and treatment of South Korea during the Olympics has reminded people of 
the arrogance of sinocentrism. Instead of new signs of Koreanization, there 
have been repeated reminders of marginalization. The reality has fallen far 
short of expectations, as economic crises a decade apart compounded fears 
of national vulnerability. Grievances cannot be resolved. Only pragmatic 
acceptance of the nation’s difﬁ cult circumstances in the short term buttressed 
by renewed pride over what was accomplished in the Cold War era offers 
hope for coping in troubled times.
What could break the impasse in South Korean national identity? A crisis 
in which the North Korean military threatens and targets the South along 
with Japan and the United States would bolster the conservative worldview. 
If this were accompanied by a loss of conﬁ dence in China, as diplomatic 
broker and economic engine, a sharp shift might follow. This is more likely 
than a collapse of North Korea that leads to reuniﬁ cation. It also may be 
made easier by ﬁ nancial crisis that exposes serious limitations in China’s 
model of growth and reinvigorates the international community aware of 
the still indispensable role of the United States and its renewed potential 
under a leader such as Barack Obama. Yet, clarity about identity cannot 
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be expected just from danger that puts national interest in the forefront. It 
must also ﬁ nd substance from reexamination of the country’s past and of 
its international linkages. Conservatives may gain an edge over progres-
sives, but they must take care to construct a shared narrative if they aspire 
to leave an enduring legacy.
Although diverse views exist on what might constitute a shared source of 
pride for most South Koreans, I conclude by listing four elements: (1) Cold 
War achievements, economically with rapid growth, politically with genuine 
democratization, militarily with growing capacity to resist aggression, and 
socially with remarkable mobility and entry into the international commu-
nity; (2) the “Korean wave” as indication of cultural vitality; (3) adaptability 
in the post–Cold War era, responding to economic crises, showing a spirit 
of generosity to North Korea when possible, and accelerating globalization; 
and (4) vision and promise as the facilitator of regionalism in Northeast Asia 
that could reconcile serious differences in an area with exceptional promise. 
Compared with other states around the world, South Koreans have ample 
reason to take pride in their national identity.
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